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than on the way soldiers are organized
before and during combat.” In other
words, post-facto law enforcement is only
one tool, and not a powerful one at that,
in the struggle to prevent atrocities and
war crimes.
It is this breadth of treatment that lifts
Osiel’s discussion far above stereotypical
legal analysis and makes it a truly signifi-
cant contribution to the literature of mil-
itary professionalism and military ethics.
Obeying Orders connects the moral argu-
ment deeply to the professional commit-
ments of soldiering. Members of the
military profession should be encouraged
to exercise their ethical judgment over as
wide a scope as possible within the func-
tional requirements of military effective-
ness and efficiency.
It would be a shame and a mistake if only
military and civilian lawyers chose to
read this profound meditation on the
moral foundations of soldiering itself. In-
formed by military practicality, and re-
spectful of the possibilities of deepening
and widening the highest senses of mili-
tary professionalism, Obeying Orders is
the first book on professional ethics that a
seasoned officer ought to read.
MARTIN L. COOK
Professor of Ethics
U.S. Army War College
Smith, George W. The Siege at Hue. Boulder, Colo.:
Lynne Rienner, 1999. 195pp. $49.95
George W. Smith has provided an excel-
lent historical summary of the battle of
Hue, based on his personal experience as
an information officer assigned to the 1st
Division of the Army of the Republic of
(South) Vietnam (ARVN), and on
after-action reports, articles, and
interviews. The book highlights the com-
plexities and dynamics of conducting
military operations in urban terrain, par-
ticularly in a combat environment.
Hue had been the imperial capital of
Vietnam, and it was the country’s cul-
tural and intellectual center. It was South
Vietnam’s third-largest city, strategically
located in the country’s narrowest part,
near the coast. One of the few cities
where until 1968 there had been no U.S.
combat presence, it was virtually unde-
fended and consequently a lucrative tar-
get for the North Vietnamese army and
the Viet Cong.
The battle of Hue was the largest single
engagement of the Vietnam War. It
lasted from 31 January to 25 February
1968 and (not counting civilian deaths)
claimed 5,713 casualties on both sides.
Smith describes the battle as a classic
joint and combined operation. The city
was divided into two areas of responsibil-
ity, with the South Vietnamese army as-
signed the mission of retaking the
northern portion and the U.S. Marines
that of regaining control south of the
Perfume River.
The urban conditions in Hue were com-
parable to those of Dodge City in the
American “Old West.” Some buildings
had wooden fronts, porches, and side-
walks; the streets were narrow, and build-
ings were densely concentrated. In the
middle of Hue, however, was a virtually
impregnable fortress known as the Cita-
del, with towers, ramparts, moats, con-
crete walls, and bunkers. The walls were
twenty-six feet high and in some sections
forty feet thick. The moat was ninety feet
wide at many points and up to twelve feet
deep. The Imperial Palace, another en-
clave within Hue, was surrounded by a
twenty-foot wall.
B O O K R E V I E W S 1 4 5
5/14/01
Monday, May 14, 2001 3:33:09 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
1
Anderson and Smith: The Siege at Hue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2001
Smith identifies three costly errors made
by the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong
on the first day of their attack. First, they
failed to overrun the 1st ARVN Division
headquarters. Second, they failed to as-
sault the U.S. Military Assistance Com-
mand Vietnam (MACV) compound.
They had sufficient forces to accomplish
both missions. Third, they failed to de-
stroy the An Cuu Bridge, south of the
city, leaving open a route by which the
Marines could reinforce and resupply the
MACV compound. The bridge was de-
stroyed five days later by enemy sappers,
but too late. These errors most likely pre-
vented the enemy from holding Hue for
longer than they did.
The value of this book lies in the lessons
learned by the forces fighting in Hue.
The first lesson was the value of accurate
intelligence. At the operational level, the
allies falsely believed that the massive
buildup of enemy troops around Khe
Sanh near the Demilitarized Zone meant
that the enemy did not have enough
manpower for a countrywide offensive.
At the tactical level, commanders rou-
tinely made decisions in the absence of
any specific intelligence about enemy
strength or dispositions in Hue. The im-
portance of intelligence is best illustrated
by the events on the night of 16 February.
The enemy suffered a tremendous set-
back when, on the basis of an intercepted
radio message, allied artillery destroyed a
battalion-sized force trying to infiltrate
through a gate on the southwestern wall.
The second lesson involved the use of air
and artillery fire support. These support-
ing arms greatly facilitate fire and ma-
neuver in any environment, especially in
cities; however, authorization for their
use in cities is normally restricted by
rules of engagement in order to limit col-
lateral damage, and Hue was no
exception. Unfortunately, the buildings
were fortresses, with interlocking lines of
fire from roofs, attics, and windows. The
South Vietnamese government eventually
lifted all restrictions on the use of heavy
weapons south of the Perfume River.
However, another limitation on heavy
firepower is weather. Naval gunfire,
eight-inch howitzer fire, and tactical air-
craft support were frequently not readily
available because of poor conditions.
The third lesson is the complexity of
house-to-house fighting. Heavy weapons,
such as tanks, 106 mm recoilless rifles,
mortars, and 3.5-inch bazookas, were
used in Hue for street fighting. Objec-
tives could be reached only by going
through buildings. The Marines dug
holes in walls through which they rushed,
clearing the rooms on the other side and
establishing sniper positions in prepara-
tion to take the next buildings. Streets
could be crossed only under a barrage of
covering fire. Mortars provided local in-
direct fire support that could be used in
lieu of larger weapons that were either
unauthorized or unavailable. Mortars
helped reduce the personnel-for-building
casualty ratio. The enemy forces in Hue
were well dug in, well supplied, and pre-
pared in some cases to fight to the finish.
None of the Marines had had any train-
ing in street fighting prior to Hue.
Today’s efforts by the Joint Staff to de-
velop urban-combat doctrine and by the
Marine Corps and Army to produce tac-
tics, techniques, and procedures are
meant to ensure that the United States
does not face the same dilemma in the
future. Seventy-five percent of the
world’s population now resides in cities.
This will equate to eight to ten billion
people by the year 2025. The U.S. mili-
tary used to fight for cities; now it is re-
quired to fight in them—cities similar to
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Hue. George W. Smith offers a very good
perspective on what such street fighting
is all about.
Joseph Anderson
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army
Naval War College
Shultz, Richard H., Jr. The Secret War against Ha-
noi: Kennedy’s and Johnson’s Use of Spies, Saboteurs,
and Covert Warriors in North Vietnam. New York:
HarperCollins, 1999. 408pp. $27.50
At its core, this is a remarkably well told
story of failure—heartbreaking failure to
be sure, and failure despite the heroic
efforts of some remarkable men to
achieve success, but still failure. The U.S.
covert war against Hanoi was, as this
book makes clear, patently unsuccessful.
That it could have been otherwise makes
the story all the more compelling.
A leading expert on low-intensity conflict
and covert warfare, Shultz has filled a gap
that has troubled those who for decades
have been trying to understand the Viet-
nam War. Using meticulously documented
research, and writing in a reader-friendly
style, Shultz lays out the history of the
U.S. Military Assistance Command Viet-
nam Studies and Observations Group
(usually referred to simply as “SOG”)
from 1964 to 1972. Such a book is argu-
ably long overdue, but classification of
material and the lack of documented in-
terviews with former SOG members crip-
pled previous attempts. At worst, the
operations of SOG have suffered gross
distortions, turning one of the war’s most
interesting features into farce and pulp
fiction. Happily, this is no longer the
case. Now, using newly declassified docu-
ments, Shultz lays to rest many of the
myths—including the now-infamous
CNN claim that Operation TAILWIND in-
volved killing U.S. deserters and the use
of the nerve agent Sarin.
Shultz begins his tale by explaining how
an aggressive Kennedy administration,
angered and humiliated by the Bay of
Pigs, formally placed CIA-controlled co-
vert operations against North Vietnam
under military leadership. President Ken-
nedy, his brother Robert, and other key
advisors wanted immediate results, and
they ignored the fact that a covert opera-
tion takes time to achieve its desired ef-
fect. Nor was the military high command
ecstatic about gaining this new responsi-
bility. A generic aversion to special oper-
ations, fear of where Kennedy might be
taking the Army, and distrust of many
involved in Special Operations, resulted
in a bureaucratic struggle of rare inten-
sity and duration. One of the tragic iro-
nies emerging from Shultz’s research is
that from the beginning, senior U.S. mili-
tary and political leaders effectively pre-
vented SOG, which was charged with the
new covert mission, from achieving its
full potential.
Thus, the cards were stacked against SOG
from the start. One obstacle was an ad-
ministration that, following President
Kennedy’s assassination, seemed hesitant
to take advantage of apparent opportuni-
ties. Nor did SOG ever receive proper
support from the military or CIA leader-
ship. Opposition from senior members of
the State Department was at times fero-
cious. In addition, SOG’s South Viet-
namese counterpart was never fully
trusted, possibly with good reason. As a
result SOG rarely had the right mandate
or qualified people, operated under
byzantine restrictions, and never
achieved a rapport with the one organi-
zation that could have dramatically in-
creased its effectiveness. Shultz also
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